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Note
What “Being a Watchdog” Really Means:
Removing the Attorney General from the
Supervision of Charitable Trusts
Kelly McNabb*
The Great Recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis
has caused significant hardships to many realms of American
society, not only economically, but also politically, psychologically, and socially.1 The charitable sector is no exception.2 For
example, universities grappling with depleted endowments
have sold assets, including charitable trusts, which once
seemed off-limits or untouchable.3 Perhaps not surprisingly,
these sales have generated litigation brought by protesters
questioning their legality.4 These cases highlight the inconsist* J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008,
University of Minnesota. Thank you to those people who provided continuous
encouragement, inspiration, and invaluable commentary during the drafting
of this Note. Special thanks to my father, Michael McNabb, for his dedicated
work for SaveWCAL and generous support and love throughout the multiple
drafts of this Note and law school generally. And thanks to charitable trust
donors—may your generosity and goodwill never be forgotten. Copyright
© 2012 by Kelly McNabb.
1. Robert J. Samuelson, The Great Stranglehold, WASH. POST, July 12,
2010, at 15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/07/11/AR2010071103038.html.
2. See Megan Loving, Comment, An Arm and a Van Gogh: Selling Art
Collections from Charitable Contributions for Capital Gain is a High Price to
Pay, 1 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 455, 455 (2009) (mentioning the
financial struggle of institutions and universities in the recent recession).
3. See, e.g., Jennifer Brooks, Fisk Says Its Survival Depends on Art Sale,
TENNESSEAN, Aug. 12, 2010, at Main News, available at 2010 WLNR
16052059 (reporting Fisk University’s attempt to sell the “renowned modern
art collection donated to Fisk half a century ago by artist Georgia O’Keeffe”);
Richard Lacayo, Brandeis’ Attempt to Turn Art into Assets, TIME (Feb. 5,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1877265,00.html (“Brandeis
University . . . stunned both the academic and art worlds when it announced
that it would shut down its Rose Art Museum and sell the collection.”).
4. See, e.g., In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994 -III, at 1 (Ch. Tenn., Sept. 14,
2010), available at http://www.tennessean.com/assets/pdf/DN164021914.pdf
(discussing the attempt to keep the Stieglitz Art Collection at Fisk Universi-
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encies among regulatory approaches taken by attorneys general, who traditionally monitor the governance of charitable
trusts to ensure compliance with the donors’ intents. For instance, the Minnesota Attorney General did not intervene when
St. Olaf College sold WCAL, a radio station created by donors,
to Minnesota Public Radio.5 On the other hand, the Tennessee
Attorney General attempted, so far unsuccessfully, to take control of the Stieglitz Art Collection from Fisk University.6 The
Attorney General continues to seek prevention of the University’s sale of the collection—a gift from Georgia O’Keeffe that
created a charitable trust—as the school hunts for a means of
“digging out of its financial hole.”7
Theoretically, when overseeing charitable trusts attorneys
general are restricted to considering the donors’ intent or the
public interest.8 But other forces are likely at work. For one, attorneys general are influenced by politics.9 Second, monitoring
the administration of charitable trusts may not always be the
top priority of attorneys general among the numerous other duties entrusted to their offices.10 Indeed, given the scope of duties vested to attorneys general, it is easy to see how charitable
trusts would not be a primary concern.
ty); In re WCAL Charitable Trust, No. A09-703, 2009 WL 5092650, at *4
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009) (discussing SaveWCAL’s challenge of the sale of
WCAL Radio).
5. Order at 5, In re Certain Gifts to St. Olaf Coll., No. CV-06-2518 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. June 10, 2008) (noting the lack of action by the attorney general and
the district court judge’s declaration that he was “absolutely mystified as to why
the State Attorney General did not become involved in a sale of trust assets”).
6. Brooks, supra note 3, passim.
7. Jennifer Brooks, Judge Rejects State’s Plan to Move Fisk Art,
TENNESSEAN (Sept. 15, 2010, 2:34 AM), http://www.tennessean.com/article/
20100915/NEWS01/9150359/judge-rejects-state-s-plan-to-move-Fisk-art;
see
also Duane Marsteller, Art Deal in Jeopardy, TENNESSEAN, Jan. 7, 2012, at
News, available at 2012 WLNR 447365 (explaining the continued efforts of the
Tennessee Attorney General to prevent the sale).
8. See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism & Paternalism in State
Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 946–48 (2004) (discussing the
challenges of monitoring fiduciaries and ensuring that charitable donations
are spent “as represented to donors”).
9. Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 537–38 (1994)
(noting that with the expansion of the “size and responsibilities of state attorneys general’s offices” came a breed of attorneys general that were more interested “in getting votes and enhancing their own political careers” than in “protecting the citizens of their states” (citation omitted)).
10. See Brody, supra note 8 ( pointing out the wide range of areas monitored by attorneys general).
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Therefore, although the “responsibility for public supervision of charitable trusts traditionally has been delegated to the
Attorney General,”11 this Note argues that state attorneys general are not the most effective parties to govern charitable
trusts. Part I explains the background and current structure of
charitable trust law, and the role that attorneys general have
traditionally played in the administration and disposition of
charitable trusts. Part II addresses why this current structure
has proved unworkable, as evidenced by the recent tumultuous
sales of charitable trusts, the inconsistencies among attorneys
general, and why attorneys general cannot always be effective
watchdogs. This Part also addresses the shortcomings of proposed solutions to the supervision of charitable trusts. And finally, Part III proposes that an independent, self-funded, quasi-state agency should be vested with the authority to monitor
charitable trusts. This Note concludes that oversight by an independent quasi-state agency reduces political influence on supervision and ensures that oversight of charitable trusts will
remain a priority in order to protect the public interest each
charitable trust serves.
I. CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND THE ROLE OF STATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL
This Part introduces the general law and development of
charitable trusts, including the role of attorneys general in
monitoring trusts created to promote the public interest.12 It
continues by setting the foundation for the argument that is
developed in Part II of this Note—namely, that attorneys general have failed to supervise charitable trusts effectively. This
Part concludes by explaining the effect of the current financial
crisis on the charitable sector, noting it has only exacerbated
the unresolved problems in charitable trust law.
11. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 330 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2002).
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No.
5, 2009) (noting that there may be a need for special interest standing because
attorneys general lack sufficient means of enforcement); James J. Fishman,
Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 224 (2003) (“The object of charitable trusts is to benefit the community rather than private individuals.”); About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/
about_naag.php ( last visited June 4, 2012) (“As chief legal officers of the
states, commonwealths, and territories of the United States, the Attorneys
General serve as counselors to state government agencies and legislatures,
and as representatives of the public interest.”).
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A. THE LAW OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
Charitable trusts are created for a variety of reasons,
which include: “(a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of
knowledge or education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) the
promotion of health; (e) governmental or municipal purposes;
and (f) other purposes that are beneficial to the community.”13
The trustee of a charitable trust, such as a university or a hospital, manages the trust in accordance with the trust’s publicinterest purpose(s).14 The charitable trust document defines the
purposes and objectives, as well as administrative procedures
for managing the trust.15 The trustee is bound by the wishes of
the donor and is barred from deviating from those specific purposes.16 Therefore, the trustee has fiduciary duties to honor the
intent of the donor.17
Additionally, because charitable trusts benefit the community and do not have ascertainable beneficiaries, the trusts are
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003); see Terri Lynn Helge,
Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through a Federal
Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 15 n.77 (2009)
(“[E]ducational institutions and hospitals represented approximately 70% of
registered public charity resources.”).
14. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 133 (2004) (“A charitable
trust is similar to a private trust in that a trustee holds and manages the
property not for the benefit of specified individuals but for certain defined
purposes that are considered to be of benefit to the public at large.”).
15. Fishman, supra note 12, at 225.
16. 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 75 (2011) (“If a charitable organization accepts a bequest for a specific purpose, it is bound to use the bequest for the
purpose specified and the trustees of the organization will be barred from using it for any other purpose.”); Ilana H. Eisenstein, Comment, Keeping Charity
in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes Foundation and the Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1747, 1756–57 (2003); see also John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the
Management of Restricted Charitable Gifts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 128
(2010) (“[D]onors impose restrictions in order (1) to support the donor’s belief
in worthy charitable objectives and the causes best suited to accomplishing
those objectives; (2) to constrain charitable management from straying from
the donor’s own view of what are, or how to accomplish those charitable objectives; (3) to freeze in place the donor’s individual notions of appropriate but
evolving public policy; and (4) quite simply, to exercise and enjoy a significant
power that society has chosen to bestow on donors through the law of charitable gifts.”).
17. See, e.g., Helge, supra note 13, at 9 (“These fiduciary standards are the
duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the duty of obedience.”); Robert A. Katz,
Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not Curb Board Discretion Over a Charitable Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 694 (2005) (“The trustee is subject to the fiduciary duties of loyalty . . . and care.”).
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“not subject to the rule against perpetuities, and are therefore
of unlimited duration.”18 Consequentially, it is only natural
that at some point the donor’s restrictions on the charitable
trust may become problematic or unworkable.19 In the event
that this happens, the trustee can seek judicial approval
through the cy près doctrine, which allows the courts to override “unlawful, impossible, or impracticable” restrictions.20 It is
presumed that by modifying or releasing donor restrictions the
charitable trust will be “saved,” yet still follow the donor’s overall wishes.21 Although at first glance the cy près doctrine seems
unobjectionable, problems may arise in deciphering donors’
intent.22
Moreover, the longevity of charitable trusts does not only
create problems when determining donor intent when the trust
becomes unfeasible. Honoring donor intent—a strict standard
of charitable trust law—in the face of economic and social
changes also creates complexities in monitoring and preventing
the misuse of charitable trusts. As explained in more detail be-

18. Fishman, supra note 12. Because charitable trusts are created to benefit the public interest, the justification for allowing the gift in spite of the rule
against perpetuities is that the “funds are being devoted, or ultimately will be
devoted, to a public purpose, and therefore the indefinite life of the charitable
gift is an irrelevant consideration.” Robert J. Lynn, Perpetuities: The Duration
of Charitable Trusts and Foundations, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1074, 1083 (1966).
However, it has been proved that these charitable gifts can be mismanaged
and wasted, and because the trust has a “life of its own” the mismanagement
often goes “unnoticed and therefore unchecked.” Id. Although it is an interesting argument to apply the rule against perpetuities, or some version of the
rule, to charitable trusts to avoid the litigation battles that have been experienced across the nation recently, see Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the
Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV.
1183, 1186–87 (2007), this Note will argue that an effective watchdog will cure
these issues, while still allowing donor’s wishes to be carried out well into the
future. Restructuring trust law is unnecessary.
19. Eason, supra note 16, at 124 –25 (stating that cy près is a mechanism
to address these changing circumstances and objectives).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003); see also Eason, supra
note 16, at 141–44 (elaborating on a trustee’s fiduciary duties and the use of
the cy près doctrine).
21. See Brody, supra note 18, at 1236–39 (outlining the cy près doctrine);
Eason, supra note 16, at 125 (noting that the cy près doctrine authorizes “modification of the donor’s restrictive mandates”).
22. Eason, supra note 16, at 125, 126 (describing the fact-specific inquiry
involved in deciphering donor intent and the chilling effect the cy près doctrine
can have on charitable giving).
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low, the law of charitable trusts has struggled to find an adequate solution to the regulation of charitable trusts.23
B. THE ROLE OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL IN SUPERVISING
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
Attorneys general have a significant role in the supervision
of charitable trusts. If the trustee of a charitable trust breaches
his fiduciary duty,24 state attorneys general have traditionally
held the power to enforce the trusts, drawing on charitable
trusts’ purpose to benefit the public at large.25 This role was
inherited from English law and is “known as parens patriae.”26
The power allows the attorney general to bring suit to correct
any abuses of the charitable trust, but it does not allow the attorney general to act as a “co-trustee of a charitable trust.”27 In
some states this authority to enforce charitable trusts is statu23. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS pt. II, ch.
3, at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (claiming that the law of charitable trusts
contains only broad boundaries rather than specific guidance).
24. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 229–30 (“There are generally three
main types of fiduciary breach: (1) of the duty of loyalty involving a misappropriation of an asset or something of value, (2) of the duty of care consisting of
the negligent attention to the beneficiaries’ needs or estate, [or, with charitable trusts, neglecting the public interest defined in the charitable trust instrument], and (3) of the duty of obedience, requiring compliance with the expressed purposes of the organization.” (footnotes omitted)).
25. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 330 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2002) (“[ I ]n every proceeding which affects a charitable trust, whether the action concerns invalidation, administration, termination or enforcement, the
attorney general must be made a party of record because the public as the real
party in interest in the trust is otherwise not properly represented.” (quoting
In re Pruner’s Estate, 136 A.2d 107, 110 (Pa. 1957))); MODEL PROT. OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 3 (2011), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Shared/Docs/AM2011_Prestyle%20Finals/MPOCAA_PreStyleFinal_Jul11.pdf;
Helge, supra note 13, at 11–13, 12 n.56 (“The state attorney general has the
power to redress breaches of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of charitable
funds, mismanagement of the charitable organization, and fraud in the solicitation of charitable funds.”); Loving, supra note 2, at 460.
26. Brody, supra note 8, at 938; see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14,
at 32 (“With the decline of the use of commissions provided for in the Statute
of Charitable Uses, it fell to the Attorney General, representing the Crown as
parens patriae with a prerogative right, to protect all charitable trusts.”). For a
discussion on the development of the Attorney General’s role in England and
the incorporation of that role into the American legal system, see David Villar
Patton, The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A Historical Perspective on Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 134 –45 (2000).
27. Jennifer L. Komoroski, The Hershey Trust’s Quest to Diversify: Redefining the State Attorney General’s Role When Charitable Trusts Wish to Diversify, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1769, 1784 (2004).
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tory, and in the absence of statutory authority, attorneys general have enforcement power under common law.28
Not every state gives exclusive authority to monitor charities to the attorney general. Some states have divided that regulatory authority among “the secretary of state, the insurance
commissioner or another state agency” and the attorney general.29 Some courts have also granted standing to private individuals to enforce the charitable trust if the individual can
demonstrate a sufficient interest in the operation of the trust.30
At the federal level, the Internal Revenue Service indirectly
regulates the charitable sector through the federal income tax
exemption for charitable organizations.31 Although other parties may play a role in trust enforcement, attorneys general
remain “the most important state player[s].”32
For centuries attorneys general have participated in the
regulation of charitable trusts and partaken in cy près proceed28. Helge, supra note 13, at 12 n.58; William P. Marshall, Break Up the
Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided
Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2452–53 (2006).
29. DAVID BIEMESDERFER & ANDRAS KOSARAS, COUNCIL ON FOUNDS.,
THE VALUE OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STATE CHARITY REGULATORS & PHILANTHROPY 14 (2006), available at http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/
Building%20Strong%20Ethical%20Foundations/06AGreportfull.pdf; see also
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 364 –70 (explaining that other agencies
“are empowered to supervise at least some aspects of the administration of
charities”); Brody, supra note 8, at 949 (“[D]epending on the industry in which
it operates, a given nonprofit organization might also be regulated by such
other agencies as the insurance commissioner, the department of health, education, or commerce, or the corporations commission.”).
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No.
5, 2009) (summarizing cases that recognize standing of private individuals due
to their special interest in a particular charitable trust); Helge, supra note 13,
at 35–36 (observing that courts are allowing private parties to bring suits on
behalf of charitable trusts on a more frequent basis); see also infra notes 67–71
and accompanying text. But see Brody, supra note 18, at 1187 (“Traditionally,
private parties—including donors—have no legal authority to sue to enforce
charitable duties.”).
31. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 56–62 (outlining the historical
development of federal tax exemptions for charitable organizations); Kenneth
L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 437–39 (1960) (discussing the general effect of
federal tax law on charitable organizations). This Note will not focus on the
regulatory role of the IRS in charitable trust governance because regulation at
the state level is preferred.
32. Brody, supra note 8, at 943; see also Helge, supra note 13, at 13
(“[T]he effectiveness of state regulation of the charitable sector depends almost
entirely on the manner in which the attorney general performs his enforcement function.”).
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ings.33 But it was not until the end of World War II that attorneys general prominently took action to enforce charitable trust
law.34 By the early 1950s, several states adopted laws requiring
charitable trusts to register and report to the attorney general,35 and in 1954 the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws adopted a model act.36 A number of
states have adopted this Uniform Act or similar legislation37 in
order to improve the supervision of the charitable sector by the
attorney general.38 For those organizations required to act in
accordance with this legislation,39 the most significant provision in the Uniform Act requires charities to register with the

33. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 54; Fishman, supra note 12, at 259
(analogizing to English law, from which the attorney general’s power was
adopted, and noting that “[e]ven before the enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses in 1601, suits were brought by the attorney general to enforce charitable trusts.”).
34. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 54, 311.
35. Id. at 312 (noting that following the New Hampshire Charitable Trustees Act, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ohio, and Massachusetts legislatures
passed similar bills between 1950 and 1954); Karst, supra note 31, at 479
(stating that New Hampshire was the first state to require registration and
reporting); see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:28 (LexisNexis 1955) (requiring
registration and reporting for New Hampshire charitable trusts).
36. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 54, 311–12 (explaining the adoption and approval by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association,
of the National Association of Attorneys General, and the Commissioners’
draft of a Uniform Act for Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes).
37. Id. at 312–13; Brody, supra note 8, at 951–52 & n.53 (“[T]welve states
have some form of charity registration.”).
38. BIEMESDERFER, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that the Uniform Act has
“several provisions intended to enhance the attorney general’s knowledge of
the existence and administration of charities”); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note
14, at 54. “New York State has one of the most comprehensive notice and oversight schemes.” Brody, supra note 8, at 951–52. The Attorney General’s Charities Bureau manages all registration and annual reports, as well as responding to and investigating complaints about improper actions by charities. See
N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., About the Charities Bureau, CHARITIES
NYS.COM, http://www.charitiesnys.com/about_new.jsp ( last visited June 4,
2012). For the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’
recently developed model act on attorney general protection of charitable assets, see MODEL PROTECTION OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT (2011), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/AM2011_Prestyle%20Finals/MPOCAA_
PreStyleFinal_Jul11.pdf.
39. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 315 (“[C]ertain charities are
exempted from the filing requirements, most commonly religious organizations and governmental entities.”); Helge, supra note 13, at 14 –15 (“Of these
eleven jurisdictions, most exempt schools and hospitals . . . from the filing
requirement.”).
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attorney general upon creation or shortly thereafter and periodically report financial information.40
To date only twelve states have adopted the Uniform Act or
similar legislation to protect charitable trusts from breaches of
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.41 But many more states
have endowed their attorneys general with power to police
charitable trusts that seek contributions through laws regulating charitable solicitation.42 In the 1940s, the increase of funds
from the public to charitable organizations, coupled with “publicized scandals,” led to state legislation regulating the solicitation of charitable funds.43 This regulatory power is often incorporated into the consumer protection duties of attorneys
general, and is therefore generally better staffed and managed
than the supervision by attorneys general over the fiduciary
duties of trustees to the charitable trusts in honoring the intent
of donors.44
C. CRITICISMS OF THE REGULATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
Even with these increased investigative powers, attorneys
general have not curbed all instances of abuse and misuse of
charitable trusts.45 As mentioned above, recent litigation involving sales of charitable trusts demonstrates the unresolved
issues within charitable trust law and the uncertainty involved
in enforcing a trust in accordance with donors’ intent.46 Schol-

40. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 315.
41. Id. at 443.
42. Id. (explaining that “thirty-nine of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia” have laws regulating “solicitations of funds for charitable purposes”); see STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 186
(Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) [hereinafter STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL] (explaining that the solicitation filing requirements stem from the fact that in the
1940s the number of charities increased, and as a result “fund raising became
more sophisticated”). However, “[i]t should be emphasized that the regulation
of charitable trusts and the regulation of charitable solicitations need not be
mutually exclusive functions, even though in practice they are often treated
that way.” Id.
43. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42.
44. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 443.
45. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 263–64 (explaining that registration
and reporting does not make the “attorney general an active or efficient monitor of nonprofit organization or improve charitable accountability” and most of
this information is disregarded anyways).
46. See supra notes 4 –7 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., THE ART OF
THE STEAL (IFC Films 2010) (calling the “takeover” of the Barnes Foundation
a “vast conspiracy” in which the attorney general was aware and even a party
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ars have argued that changes in the regulatory authority must
be made to improve accountability of the trustees.47 Commentators have proposed supervisory organizations at the state and
federal level, including committees that report to the attorney
general or wholly separate entities.48 The American Law Institute is currently working on a project on the governance of
nonprofit organizations.49 Chapter Six of the Principles of the
Law of Nonprofit Organization will deal with supervision and
enforcement, but the full scope of the project is expected to take
several more years.50 Similarly, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law recently drafted a model
act that states can adopt regarding attorneys general protection of charitable assets.51 The committee focused “on state attorneys general authority with regard to the protection of charitable assets, notice requirements, remedies, and principles to
guide attorneys general in interstate and multi-state cases.”52
Although many scholars have addressed the problems that are
embedded in charitable trust law, as explained in detail in Part
II, a workable solution has yet to be found.
D. CHARITABLE TRUSTS IN UNCERTAIN TIMES
The unresolved issues in charitable trust law were exacerbated when the Great Recession hit. The charitable sector has
of the moving of the Barnes art collection to downtown Philadelphia, which
was contrary to an explicit restriction by Barnes himself ).
47. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 8, at 1035 (mentioning proposals for charities boards or supervisory commissions); Helge, supra note 13, at 1 (arguing in
favor of a federal quasi-public agency to regulate charitable organizations).
48. Fishman, supra note 12, at 272, 287 ( proposing a state advisory committee, which would operate under the attorney general to improve the investigation of wrongdoings and to develop the accountability of the charitable sector); Helge, supra note 13, at 1 (suggesting a “new, federal, quasi-public
agency that would be the principal regulator of the charitable sector”); Karst,
supra note 31, at 476–77 ( proposing that a separate state-funded administrative agency hold the responsibility to regulate charities).
49. Current Projects: Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations,
A.L.I.,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=3
( last visited June 4, 2012).
50. Id.
51. MODEL PROT. OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT (2011), available at http://
www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/AM2011_Prestyle%20Finals/MPOCAA_
PreStyleFinal_Jul11.pdf.
52. Memorandum from Stanley C. Kent to Connie T. Eyster, Statutory
Revision Comm. Chair (Mar. 4, 2010), available at http://www.cobar
.org/repository/Inside_Bar/TrustEstate/SRC/SRC%20UNIFORM%20ACTS%20
REPORT-03-04 -2010.pdf.
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not been shielded from the economic downturn.53 Although
strict adherence to the donors’ wishes is fundamental to charitable trust law and is supported by social and moral perspectives,54 an economy in turmoil may provide a financial incentive
to avoid this stringent requirement.55 Yet without demonstrated compliance to the intent of donors, charitable giving, and
creation of charitable trusts will be discouraged if donors’ fear
their wishes will not be honored.56 Therefore, in situations
where the conditions of a charitable trust become problematic,
the intent of donors must be balanced against the public benefit, which is, after all, the overarching goal of charitable
trusts.57
II. THE DOWNFALLS OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL AS THE
CHARITABLE TRUSTS’ WATCHDOGS
This Part of the Note addresses the shortcoming of attorneys general as the overseers of charitable trusts and explores
alternatives that could better balance donors’ intent with the
public benefit. Several elements contribute to the ineffectiveness of attorneys general, including: the variety of duties imposed on attorneys general that make charitable trusts a secondary concern; the practical concern of lacking funding in the
53. See GUIDESTAR, THE EFFECT OF THE ECONOMY ON THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR 3 (2010) (showing a total decrease in contributions to nonprofit organizations in the first half of 2010 compared to the previous year); Noelle Barton
& Holly Hall, Donations Dropped 11% at Nation’s Biggest Charities Last Year,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 17, 2010), available at http://philanthropy.com/
article/A-Sharp-Donation-Drop-at-Big/125004/ (observing charitable giving
has dropped significantly, and there are no signs that point to a recovery).
54. See Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 1757 (“Steadfast respect for donor
intent has been justified by theories of private property, freedom of testation,
and society’s moral and legal obligation to the donor’s largess.”).
55. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 3 (reporting that Fisk University chose to
sell its donated collection of art out of financial necessity); Scott Jaschik,
Brandeis Will Keep Its Art, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 1, 2011, 3:00 AM),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/07/01/brandeis_settles_suits_by_
agreeing_to_keep_its_art_collection (same at Brandeis University); see also Evelyn Brody, The Charity in Bankruptcy and Ghosts of Donors Past, Present, and
Future, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 471, 528 (2005) (“[ I ]f assets are held for narrow charitable purposes, redeployment within the charity can be impeded,
perhaps even precipitating financial collapse.”).
56. Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 1758.
57. Fishman, supra note 12; see also Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing
to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 39 (1993) (“[State governments] would have to balance the vital societal interest in promoting charitable work, with the intertwined need to maintain public confidence in, and financial support of, that work by ensuring honest and competent management.”).
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offices of attorneys general; and the innate political nature of
being an elected official, which subjects attorneys general to
improper political pressures. Specific examples from the Barnes
Foundation and WCAL transactions illustrate the type of powerful political actors involved in these dealings, leading to the
susceptibility of attorneys general failing to enforce charitable
trusts. Additionally, this Part criticizes proposals, as briefly
mentioned above, that would create an organization that reports to the state attorney general because such an organization would not remove political influences. Shortcomings of
proposals that would create a separate, yet state-funded agency
are also examined in this Part. As a final point, this Part will
argue a federal agency would not adequately respond to the
public interests at a state level.
A. LACK OF MOTIVATION, TIME, RESOURCES, AND POLITICAL
INFLUENCE DIMINISH THE ABILITY OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO
ENFORCE CHARITABLE TRUSTS
Attorneys general have shown to be ineffective watchdogs
to curb exploitation of charitable trusts.58 One reason for this
ineffectiveness is a lack of motivation and time, which can be
attributed to the numerous duties that are imposed on attorneys general.59 Secondly, offices of the attorneys general generally lack adequate resources, such as funding and staff, needed
to successfully oversee charitable trusts.60 A third reason is
that since the state attorney general is an “inherently political
creature” the “incentives of this nearly universally elective office impel the incumbent to ignore cases that are politically
dangerous and to jump into matters that are politically irresistible but implicate only ‘business’ decisions of charity managers.”61 As explained below, these foundational issues seem to be
embedded in the offices of the attorneys general, and in order to
58. See Brody, supra note 8, at 947 (explaining that “only a few state attorneys general have been active in a realm firmly committed to state regulation and enforcement” of the “monitoring and oversight of charities”); Fishman, supra note 12, at 268 (“It has long been demonstrated that the state
attorney general offices have neither the person-power, nor sometimes the
will, to monitor nonprofits effectively.”); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS. pt. II, ch. 3, at 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (“It has
seemed acceptable for charities to be governed casually, if not ceremonially, by
their boards, allowing too much reign to management . . . .”).
59. See Patton, supra note 26, at 165 (noting the “impossibly overwhelming case load” for which attorneys general are responsible).
60. Brody, supra note 8, at 939; Patton, supra note 26, at 166.
61. Brody, supra note 8, at 947–48.
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avoid these problems the charitable-trust-supervisory role
should be removed from attorneys general.
1. Attorneys General Lack the Interest, Motivation, and Time
to Supervise Charitable Trusts
The offices of attorneys general lack the incentive necessary to effectively supervise charitable trusts. The habitual
long list of duties of attorneys general—ranging from antitrust
enforcement to the supervision of charitable trusts (at the bottom of the list)—stem from their role as the “chief legal officers
of the states, commonwealths, and territories of the United
States . . . .”62 Among all these obligations, regulation of the
charitable sector comprises only a “small subset of the state attorney general’s larger role as a consumer protector.”63 And the
primary focus within that subset is the even smaller subset of
charitable solicitations.64 The degree of focus on the solicitation
of charitable funds does not enable attorneys general to “detect
breaches of fiduciary duties by charity managers,” and because
charitable trusts generally do not “solicit funds from the public,
their operations go virtually unchecked.”65 Therefore, with respect to trustees’ violations of charitable trusts—fiduciary
breaches—attorneys general are, as one scholar put it, “‘inactive, ineffective, understaffed, overwhelmed, or some combination of these.’”66
62. About NAAG, supra note 12 (“Typical powers of the Attorneys General, while varying from one jurisdiction to the next due to statutory and constitutional mandates, now include the authority to: institute civil suits; represent state agencies; defend and/or challenge the constitutionality of legislative
or administrative actions; enforce open meetings and records laws; revoke corporate charters; enforce antitrust prohibitions against monopolistic enterprises; and enforce air, water pollution, and hazardous waste laws. In a majority
of states, handle criminal appeals and serious state-wide criminal prosecutions; intervene in public utility rate cases; and enforce the provisions of charitable trusts.”); see also Brody, supra note 8, at 946 & nn.33–36 (“In recent
years, state attorneys general have dramatically expanded their role in areas
ranging from public health to antitrust to Wall Street.”).
63. Helge, supra note 13, at 24.
64. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 443 (observing that oversight
of the solicitation of charitable funds “is far better staffed and managed in
most states than the efforts to police fiduciary duties”); Helge, supra note 13,
at 24 (“[S]tate attorneys general view their ‘biggest problem’ in the charitable
sector as deceptive charitable solicitations.”).
65. Helge, supra note 13, at 24 –25.
66. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 443 (quoting Harvey P. Dale,
Norman A. Sugarman Memorial Lecture: Diversity, Accountability, and Compliance in the Nonprofit Sector (Mar. 20, 1991)); see also Fishman, supra note
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The judiciary has noticed this lack of enthusiasm to enforce
charitable trusts. Courts have allowed private parties to bring
suit to enforce the trust.67 Courts have not usually granted
standing to the general public because of the fear that fiduciaries, faced with constant harassment from litigation, would find
it impossible and impractical to manage charitable funds.68 Instead the interested private party would have to try to persuade the attorney general into filing suit.69 However, attorneys general have reasons not to enforce the trust, such as lack
of resources and political incentives. Additionally, private parties who are interested in the charitable trust are more likely to
avidly pursue enforcement of the donors’ wishes as compared to
attorneys general.70 Therefore, the courts developed the rule
that an individual could bring a lawsuit when the attorney
general failed to do so if the private party could demonstrate a
special benefit or interest in the trust.71
As an example of private-party action, a group called
“SaveWCAL” sued to intervene in the controversial sale of St.
Olaf College’s radio station WCAL.72 Interestingly, the Minnesota Attorney General failed to act even after determining that
WCAL was in fact a charitable trust.73 The Attorney General
was apparently uncertain about what “course of action [to take]
to prevent or to cure a breach of trust.”74 During a hearing in
the litigation the Deputy Attorney General stated that the “Attorney General was anticipating that St. Olaf would petition
the court on ‘how it intends to use’ the sale proceeds . . . .”75 The
judge replied: “What if they don’t? I can’t go out and force them
12, at 262 (“Staffing problems and a relative lack of interest in monitoring
nonprofits make attorney general oversight more theoretical than deterrent.”).
67. Helge, supra note 13, at 36.
68. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 324 –25.
69. Id. at 325.
70. Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV.
1400, 1431 (1998).
71. See Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 20, In re WCAL Charitable
Trust, No. A09-703 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009) (“When the Attorney General fails to protect the public interest, the law allows a person with sufficient
interest who understands the purpose and the operation of the trust to do
so . . . .”); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 328 (“The general rule is that a
person must be able to show that he is entitled to a benefit from the trust beyond the benefit to which members of the public in general are entitled.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. b (1959))).
72. In re WCAL Charitable Trust, 2009 WL 5092650, at *1.
73. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 71, at 18.
74. Id. at 19.
75. Id.
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to.”76 This demonstrates that at times private parties are forced
to act and that attorneys general are reluctant to act when they
would be caught in the middle of a controversy.
In contrast with the inaction of the Minnesota Attorney
General, the Tennessee Attorney General swooped in when
Fisk University intended to sell the Stieglitz Art Collection.77
Unfortunately, the Attorney General could only develop halfmeasures to forestall the art sale.78 Tennessee trial and appellate courts concluded that the Attorney General’s “temporary
fix” was insufficient.79 Through further appeals processes, the
Tennessee Attorney General is still attempting to prevent the
sale.80 Although Tennessee’s Attorney General is actively attempting to prevent the sale of the charitable trust, his attempts have proven unsuccessful in protecting the intent of the
donor to keep the art at Fisk University.81
States have recognized the difficulties faced by attorneys
general in monitoring charitable trusts. To assist attorneys
general in overcoming difficulties in their supervisor role—
similar to those that the Minnesota and Tennessee Attorneys
General experienced—a number of states have a charity bureau
or separate division within the attorney general’s office.82 However these bureaus are not any more active or passionate about
enforcing charitable trusts than attorneys general themselves.83
Comparable to charity bureaus within the offices of the attorneys general, some scholars have proposed advisory commissions that enforce charitable trusts and operate under the su76. Id.
77. See Press Release, Office of the Tenn. Att’y Gen., Attorney General
Files for Potential Temporary Stieglitz Collection Display Arrangement (Sept.
10, 2010), available at http://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/press/2010/story/pr10
-33.pdf.
78. See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994 -III, at 1–2 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Sept. 14,
2010), available at http://www.tennessean.com/assets/pdf/DN164021914.PDF.
79. Id. at 2.
80. See Marsteller, supra note 7.
81. See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994 -III, at 5 (allowing a sale that would
keep the art at Fisk University only half the time); Marsteller, supra note 7
(noting that this ruling was upheld on appeal); Jennifer Brooks, Fisk, AG Unhappy With Art Ruling, TENNESSEAN, Nov. 5, 2010, at Main News (discussing
the 2010 ruling).
82. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42, at 183; see, e.g., CHARITIES NYS.COM, http://www.charitiesnys.com/about_new.jsp ( last visited June
4, 2012).
83. Fishman, supra note 12, at 268.
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pervision of the attorney general.84 Although advisory commissions have qualities that would improve the current regulation
of charitable trusts, the potential downfalls prove it unworkable. First and foremost, the ultimate ability to determine charitable trust mismanagement and prosecution would be left to attorneys general, thus not avoiding the intrinsic problems
associated with their offices.85 Furthermore, just as attorneys
general are motivated by political goals,86 seemingly neutral
actors may have other objectives in mind than serving the intended public purpose of the charitable trust. Additionally, politically influential individuals support commissions and thus
those powerful parties could influence the neutrality of the advisory commission.87
These concerns can be analogized to apprehensions about
presidential advisory commissions. Presidential advisory commissions have been described as unfavorable because they allow the President to avoid his responsibilities, are not more motivated or effective than the President, are in fact controlled by
the White House, and the commission’s suggestions are ultimately ignored when action actually is taken.88 Therefore, it is
unlikely that advisory commissions under the control of attorneys general would solve the issues of uninterested and inactive supervision.
In sum, the time and focus that attorneys general typically
devote to charitable trusts has contributed to their ineffectiveness as charitable trust watchdogs. Even though courts have
recognized the problems associated with an inactive regulator
by increasingly granting standing to private parties to enforce
charitable trusts, private suits have repercussions of their
own.89 Additionally, separate divisions within the offices of the
attorneys general, which were created to support the supervi84. See, e.g., id. at 272.
85. See Helge, supra note 13, at 59–60 (“[R]elying on the attorney general
to prosecute wrongdoings found by the commission invokes all of the previously discussed financial, institutional, political, and agency constraints.”).
86. For a discussion of how politics affects decisionmaking in the offices of
attorneys general, see infra Part II.A.3.
87. THOMAS R. WOLANIN, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSIONS 141
(1975) (“[T]hose who advocate that commissions be created are generally politically sophisticated, influential people . . . .”).
88. Id. at 3.
89. See generally Brody, supra note 18, at 189 (explaining that courts
have “not been consistent in the legal theory they apply, and they sometimes
do not apply their chosen legal theory accurately” to questions of standing and
the spillover effect of these judicial decisions).
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sion by attorneys general, have not shown to cure the lack of
attention given to charitable trusts. Although the multiple duties vested to the offices of the attorneys general can explain
part of this indifference for charitable trusts, the lack of resources and political pressure also adds to the disappointment
of attorneys general in curbing the abuse of charitable trusts.
2. Lack of Resources in the Offices of Attorneys General
Attorneys general also lack the resources needed to enforce
charitable trusts. Because there is typically a large volume of
charitable trusts in each state, attorneys general need to be
equipped with adequate resources, including information, time,
staff, and funding, to investigate and prosecute charitable
wrongdoings.90 However, as discussed above, the charitable
sector is usually only a subset of the consumer protections obligations of the attorneys general.91 Additionally, because of the
financial crisis state budgets likely will not allow extra funding
to be allocated to monitoring charitable trusts.92 “As a practical
matter, then, only abuses that (1) involve high dollar amounts,
(2) receive media attention and notoriety, or (3) involve particularly reprehensible behavior, are subject to the attorney general’s scrutiny.”93 The thousands of other charitable trusts and
organizations are left with no oversight.94
Insufficient information regarding charitable trusts plays a
role in attorneys general neglecting the exploitation of the
trusts.95 Only a handful of states have enacted some sort of registration and reporting with the attorneys general for charitable organizations, including charitable trusts.96 Since the majority of states do not require reporting that identifies fiduciary
breaches (but instead focuses on charitable solicitation), abuses

90. Patton, supra note 26, at 166.
91. Helge, supra note 13, at 24.
92. See ELIZABETH MCNICHOL ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT 1 (Jan. 9, 2012), http://
www.cbpp.org/files/9-8-08sfp.pdf (explaining how budget shortfalls have
prompted lawmakers to make deep cuts in critical public services).
93. Patton, supra note 26, at 166.
94. Id.
95. See Helge, supra note 13, at 15 (“[T]he forty jurisdictions that do not
require annual reporting from non-soliciting charities do not receive any information, and thus cannot discern breaches of fiduciary duties . . . .”).
96. See Brody, supra note 8, at 951–52 & n.53.
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of charitable trusts,97 which do not always solicit funds from
the public, will escape detection by the attorneys general.
Moreover, organizations that constitute the majority of the
revenue for the charitable sector are exempt from the registering and reporting requirements.98 Exempt institutions include
“churches and other religious organization[s], educational institutions, and hospitals and organizations that annually raise
less than a particular amount.”99 Only eleven states require reporting for nonsoliciting charities and organizations, such as
universities and hospitals that compose seventy percent of
charitable resources.100 Attorneys general are unable to fulfill
their duty to oversee charitable trusts that they may not even
know exist. As a result a substantial number of fiduciary
breaches will go unnoticed, not only because attorneys general
are more focused on corrupt solicitation, but also because of the
lack of information supplied to attorneys general regarding the
management of the trusts.101
This lack of information, coupled with the many other obligations imposed on attorneys general, disincentivizes attorneys
general to recognize and curb abuses of charitable trusts, and is
only exacerbated by states’ lack of monetary resources.102 The
United States is currently recovering from its largest recession
since the 1930s.103 Because of this financial crisis the states are
suffering huge budget deficits that compel substantial reduction in services.104 With no end in sight, significant public services will likely continue to struggle with funding shortages for
years.105 This lack of funding, for example, does not permit attorneys general to staff their offices adequately, leading to in-

97. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 443.
98. See id. at 315.
99. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42, at 187.
100. See Helge, supra note 13, at 14 –15, 15 n.77.
101. See id. at 15 (suggesting that a lack of reporting makes it difficult to
“discern breaches of fiduciary duties from a substantial majority of charitable
organizations”).
102. Id. at 14 n.74; Komoroski, supra note 27,.
103. See MCNICHOL ET AL., supra note 92 (noting the recession that began
in 2007 has caused the largest collapse in state revenues on record); Samuelson, supra note 1.
104. MCNICHOL ET AL., supra note 92; David Von Drehle, The Other Financial Crisis, TIME, June 28, 2010, at 22 (describing state budget deficits).
105. MCNICHOL ET AL., supra note 92.
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adequate review of the reported information.106 This shortage
of resources only adds to the lack of accountability in the charitable sector.107
3. Attorneys General Need the Vote
Although “attorneys general almost universally lack sufficient resources to effectively oversee and enforce charitable
gifts,”108 the laxity cannot be attributed solely to the lack of resources.109 The fact that attorneys general are elected officials110 may also affect the motives of attorneys general to intervene on abuses of charitable trusts.111 Attorneys general are
the second most prevalent statewide-elected office, next to governors.112 Since attorneys general are surrounded by the media
and politics,113 it is not surprising that attorneys general will
ignore the transactions that could hurt them politically, yet
prosecute those that are politically favorable.114
106. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 445 (explaining that the “few
active programs in existence operate with limited staff and inadequate financial resources”); Fishman, supra note 12, at 262–63.
107. See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 38–39; Helge, supra note 13, at 20–
21; Komoroski, supra note 27.
108. Loving, supra note 2, at 460.
109. Brody, supra note 8, at 952–53.
110. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42, at 15; NAT’L ASSOC. OF
ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php ( last visited June 4,
2012) (“The Attorney General is popularly elected in 43 states . . . and is appointed by the governor in five states.”).
111. Brody, supra note 8, at 975 (“The typical state legal regime and political pressures produce the twin weaknesses of the charitable sector: the lack of
energy and initiative on the part of many nonprofit managers, and the lack of
resources and zeal in enforcing the public’s interest on the part of many charity regulators.”).
112. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42, at 15.
113. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the Land,
and Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1987)
(detailing how the attorney general operates in the world of politics and media).
114. Brody, supra note 8, at 947–48 (“The incentives of this nearly universally elective office impel the incumbent to ignore cases that are politically
dangerous and to jump into matters that are politically irresistible but implicate only ‘business’ decisions of charity managers.”). Additionally, outside actors can influence the political campaigns of attorneys general. EMILY
GOTTLIEB & AMY WIDMAN, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: THE PEOPLE’S CHAMPION 1 (2008), available at http://www
.cttriallawyers.org/_docs/public/CJD_State_Attorneys_General.pdf
(demonstrating influence on attorneys general by arguing “insurance, tobacco, pharmaceutical and other industries . . . have launched unfair, misleading assaults
against state Attorneys General, even to the point of manipulating state elections to defeat popular pro-consumer candidates for state Attorneys General”).
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As recognized by scholars, the controversial case In re Milton Hershey School Trust115 demonstrates how political pressures on attorneys general can dictate the officials’ actions.116
In 2001, the Milton Hershey School, which was founded in 1909
by Milton Hershey and his wife for the benefit of orphan children,117 became financially challenged.118 The trustees became
concerned about the stability of the School Trust and, after
meeting with the Pennsylvania Attorney General, who had expressed similar concerns, understood that they could sell their
interest in the trust.119 After public disagreement over the sale,
the Attorney General, who apparently had a change of heart (or
more likely, because he was running for governor)120 brought
suit to stop the sale.121 Some have alleged that this course of
action was designed to protect the Attorney General’s political
goals.122 Similarly, if the Attorney General had been running
for reelection, instead of running for governor as in this case,
he would have had the same political pressures to please the
public because he needs the vote.
Similarly, political considerations—although not the only
factor—led Walter F. Mondale, then Minnesota Attorney General, to continue the investigation his predecessor, Miles Lord,
began of the Sister Kenny Institute, a Minneapolis-based charitable foundation developed to benefit polio research.123 Mondale
uncovered a “cesspool” in which “millions of dollars were being
siphoned off for the benefit of one or two officers” of the organization.124 In his autobiography, Mondale explains that since he
was going to be up for election he thought the Sister Kenny Institute investigation would establish him with Minnesotan vot-

115. 807 A.2d 324 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
116. Brody, supra note 8, at 984 –99. However, these circumstances are
unusual in that here political influences actually acted to protect the trust,
versus the more common result of destruction of the trust.
117. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d at 328.
118. See id. at 329; Brody, supra note 8, at 989–90.
119. Brody, supra note 8, at 990–91.
120. See id. at 946 (“Political cynics believe that ‘A.G.’ stands not for ‘attorney general’ but for ‘aspiring governor.’”).
121. Id. at 989–91.
122. The attorney general’s opponent in the governor’s race was not shy in
pointing out that “[i]t was Fisher’s office who told the Hershey board they
should sell in the first place.” Id. at 998 n.302.
123. WALTER F. MONDALE WITH DAVID HAGE, THE GOOD FIGHT: A LIFE IN
LIBERAL POLITICS 15 (2010).
124. Id.

2012]

SUPERVISION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS

1815

ers.125 Mondale was influenced by political considerations to get
his foot in the door in order to carry out his programs and policies.126 This will always be a practical concern for elected officials, because unless they are elected they will not have the opportunity to carry out their policies.
Thus, although these cases demonstrate the unusual circumstance—where political influences actually acted to protect
the trust, compared to the more common result of destruction of
the trust—they further demonstrate political incentives acting
on attorneys general decisions to invoke their enforcement
power or remain “passive law office[s].”127
Political influences on an attorney general’s motive either
to step in and enforce the trust or turn a blind eye are further
heightened by the fact that in some of these complex dealings
there are powerful actors within the state seeking the unauthorized deviations from the charitable trust’s purpose.128 The
WCAL and the Barnes Foundation cases illustrate these powerful influences.
WCAL was a radio station created from charitable donations, and St. Olaf College was the trustee of this charitable
trust. By 2004 WCAL was broadcasting to more than 80,000
listeners “classical music, public-affairs programs, and religious
services” that echoed “the intellectual, spiritual, and cultural
traditions of St. Olaf.”129 Even though WCAL was serving its
intended mission,130 St. Olaf was questioning the value the radio station contributed to the educational institution.131 When
Minnesota Public Radio (MPR) made a multi-million dollar of125. Id.
126. Id. Mondale’s investigation of the Sister Kennedy Institute was “correct and legal, not just the efforts of a young political hotshot.” Id. at 18. In
fact, Mondale realized that as attorney general, he was the “trustee of charitable trusts” and was the “master of these disputes.” Id.
127. See id. at 20 (describing how Mondale changed the role of Attorney
General in Minnesota).
128. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. KING & RANDALL W. ROTH, BROKEN TRUST:
GREED, MISMANAGEMENT, & POLITICAL MANIPULATION AT AMERICA’S LARGEST CHARITABLE TRUST 279–81 (2006) (detailing the Attorney General’s refusal
to continue investigation); MONDALE WITH HAGE, supra note 123, at 16 (noting
the Sister Kenny “board included distinguished people from the Twin Cities
business and civic community . . . [s]o it was a terrible shock when the public
and the foundation’s board learned that some of its leaders were corrupt”).
129. In re WCAL Charitable Trust, No. A09-703, 2009 WL 5092650, at *1–
2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009).
130. See id. at *1. St. Olaf was also required to show that the radio station
benefited the public interest in order to be licensed by the FCC. Id.
131. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 71, at 11.
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fer to St. Olaf to buy the broadcasting license and all the associated assets, St. Olaf willingly accepted.132 Neither St. Olaf nor
MPR notified the Minnesota Attorney General of the sale nor
sought judicial approval.133 Furthermore, the directors of
WCAL, which the Federal Communications Commission required to ensure that the public was permitted to “participate
in significant policy decisions,” were not included in this decision and learned of the offer four days after St. Olaf’s acceptance.134 It was SaveWCAL, a corporation created to preserve WCAL, which disclosed the sale to the Attorney General,
who then failed to take any action to prevent the transaction.135
The potential peril for an attorney general or other elected
official who opposes a major media company was demonstrated during the MPR campaign for financing for the transaction.
MPR first turned to the Housing & Redevelopment Authority
(HRA) to issue tax-exempt bonds for the acquisition.136 When
the HRA denied the application, MPR publicly criticized the individual HRA commissioners who voted against its application.137 Although MPR then successfully applied to another
public authority to obtain the bonds,138 only SaveWCAL challenged this final sale.139 It is reasonable to assume that an
elected politician would avoid taking action in controversial
transactions, such as the sale of WCAL, in order to evade politically endangering his or her reputation.

132. In re WCAL Charitable Trust, 2009 WL 5092650, at *2; Appellant’s
Brief & Appendix, supra note 71, at 11–12.
133. In re WCAL Charitable Trust, 2009 WL 5092650, at *2.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *3.
136. See Petition to Redress Breach of Trust at 11–12, In re WCAL Charitable Trust, No. 66-CV-083602, 2009 WL 6767286 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 25,
2009) (discussing MPR ’s attempt to secure bond financing from HRA).
137. See Exhibit DDD at 2, In re WCAL Charitable Trust, No. 66-CV083602, 2009 WL 6767286 (demonstrating MPR ’s use of its website to target
commissioners who voted against the resolution). Mondale explains a similar
experience, stating: “[a]fter all the publicity on the Sister Kenny Case, I was
starting to take some hits in the political arena from people who accused me of
becoming a tyrant operating out of the attorney general’s office.” MONDALE
WITH HAGE, supra note 123, at 18.
138. Petition to Redress Breach of Trust, supra note 136, at 12 (noting that
the St. Paul Port Authority voted to issue tax-exempt bonds to finance the
transaction); Nicole Garrison-Sprenger, MPR Gets $11.5M in Financing from
St. Paul Port Authority, MINNEAPOLIS ST. PAUL BUSS. J. (Sept. 28, 2005, 9:31
AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2005/09/26/daily25.html.
139. See In re WCAL Charitable Trust, 2009 WL 5092650, at *1–4.
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As with the WCAL radio station, influential actors were interested in the Barnes Foundation.140 The Barnes Foundation
was a charitable trust developed by Dr. Albert Barnes composed of “some of the world’s finest examples of postimpressionist and early modern works . . . .”141 Because Barnes
intended to use the Foundation for educational purposes, not as
an art museum, he placed strict restrictions on the Foundation,
including a provision that the collection should never be moved
from its original location in Merion, Pennsylvania.142 However,
after the death of Barnes, the Foundation struggled to prevent
bankruptcy.143 To save the Foundation, the board of directors,
after pressure from the Pennsylvania Governor and Attorney
General,144 agreed to expand its board in consideration for financial assistance from other nonprofit organizations.145
Shortly thereafter, the expanded board successfully
brought a petition to the court in a cy près hearing asking permission to move the Barnes to Philadelphia because it was financially impossible to keep the Barnes collection in the current location.146 When the “Friends of the Barnes,” composed
partly of former students, petitioned the court to reopen the
proceedings regarding the move, the petition was dismissed
holding the petitioners did not have standing.147 Opponents of
the move argue that the expanded Board never wanted to preserve the Barnes Foundation in Merion and that there was no
one to stand up against these powerful political forces, such as
140. THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46 (“The name of the game is, if
you’re gonna leave your paintings somewhere, don’t let there be a politician
within 500 yards.”).
141. FAQS, BARNES FOUND., http://www.barnesfoundation.org/about/faq
( last visited June 4, 2012).
142. Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 1747, 1749–51; THE ART OF THE STEAL,
supra note 46. Another motivating factor for Dr. Barnes’s desired location for
the Foundation was his animosity toward the Philadelphia elite. Id.
143. Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 1752.
144. THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46 ( presenting Pennsylvania Attorney General Mike Fisher, stating that “I had to explain to them that . . . the
attorney general’s office would have to take some action involving them that
might have to change the complexion of the board”).
145. Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 1752–53; THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra
note 46.
146. THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46.
147. In re Barnes Found., 871 A.2d 792, 793–94 (Pa. 2005); Jason Edward
Kaufman, Barnes Foundation Wins Ruling to Move to City Centre: Court Dismisses Petitions From Two Organisations Hoping to Keep the Collection in
Merion County, ART NEWSPAPER, June 1, 2008, http://www.theartnewspaper
.com/article.asp?id=8571.
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the Pennsylvania Governor, Attorney General, and the heads of
the influential nonprofit organizations involved in the
transaction.148
Therefore, to avoid controversial and daunting litigation—
similar to the legal battles that took place in the WCAL and
Barnes Foundation cases—and the overwhelming issues that
plague the offices of the attorneys general, such as the lack of
motivation by attorneys general diligently to monitor charitable
trusts and the insufficient resources allocated to most of the offices of attorneys general, some have suggested supervision of
charitable trusts should be independent from the attorneys
general.149 An organization with the exclusive power to monitor
and enforce charitable trusts would allow potential fiduciary
breaches to be detected and avoided. Although political influences and ulterior motives cannot be completely removed in
matters regarding public interest, such motives would be less
persuasive to an independent party not seeking election.
B. A STATE AGENCY IS BETTER SUITED TO CURB CHARITABLE
TRUST ABUSES VERSUS AN AGENCY AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
Although independence from attorneys general seems to be
ideal, scholars have questioned if supervision of charitable
trusts should remain at the state level or move to the federal
level.150 Because only twelve states subject nonsolicitation charitable trusts to registration and reporting requirements, and
there are regulatory variations among those states, scholars
have expressed concerns about forum-shopping in an effort to
avoid strict regulations.151 Recognizing forum-shopping problems, in the 1980s the National Association of Attorneys General and the National Association of State Charity Officials began working with the IRS to improve information gathering,152
and thus avoid forum-shopping incentives.
Although federal regulation may diminish forum-shopping
concerns, federal regulation of charitable trusts would not adequately detect and defer fiduciary breaches of charitable trusts.
Recently, one commentator proposed creating a new self-funded
148. THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46.
149. See e.g., Karst, supra note 31, at 476–77.
150. Fishman, supra note 12, at 268; Helge, supra note 13, at 54.
151. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 55 (“[ W ]ide discrepancies in the
regulatory climate encouraged forum-shopping and facilitated evasion of regulation, limiting the ability of these states to correct many abuses.”).
152. Id.
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federal agency.153 In effect, the proposed agency would replace
the IRS’s obligations of regulating federal tax laws for charitable organizations, including those that are exempt.154 In essence, this proposed solution would be focused on the charitable
status of organizations for tax purposes.155 Although this proposal seems to solve charities’ wrongful manipulation of potential tax-exempt status156—crucially without the assistance of
government funding—it does not seem to adequately solve deviations of donors’ intent in charitable trusts. For example, as
described above with the Barnes Foundation, the Foundation
still serves the public interest by moving to Philadelphia and
therefore still maintains its charitable tax status; however,
housing the collection in Philadelphia was explicitly against
Barnes’ intent for his art.157 Thus, it is unlikely that a federal
agency focused on the tax status of charitable trusts would prevent fiduciary breaches or mismanagement of the trusts.
Additionally, concerns about inconsistencies between the
states regulation schemas fostering forum-shopping158 may not
be such a large fear for charitable trusts. Many charitable
trusts are created in local areas to serve interests that are near
and dear to the donors’ hearts.159 A state regulatory agency
would be better equipped to understand, evaluate, and address
the public interest being served in that particular area.160 Federal supervisors are too far removed from the localized concerns
of the charitable trusts.161 Furthermore, the IRS tax regulations that have improved reporting would not be altered if a
regulator agency was at the state level versus the federal level.
A state agency and the IRS could form a relationship to share
information and monitoring, as the National Association of Attorneys General and the National Association of State Charity

153. Helge, supra note 13, at 70.
154. Id. at 68–81.
155. Id. at 76–79.
156. Id. at 79–81.
157. See THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46.
158. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 444.
159. See Karst, supra note 31, at 482 (“[I]t should be noted that there are
some real values to be maintained in keeping charities and their control close
to the communities from which they spring, and which they seek to serve.”).
160. See id. (identifying states as regulatory laboratories best able to serve
local interests).
161. Cf. id. (arguing that federal intervention is justified only after state
experimentation has demonstrated the ideal model).
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Officials did in the 1980s,162 to prevent any possible forumshopping incentives. Thus, an independent, self-sustaining,
state agency with the power to enforce charitable trusts would
be ideal.
III. CREATING AN EFFECTIVE WATCHDOG OF
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
In order to effectively supervise charitable trusts, selffunded, independent, quasi-state agencies need to be developed.
These non-governmental agencies would be independent from,
and replace, state attorneys general as the watchdogs of charitable trusts. These agencies would be responsible for the information collecting, evaluating, and prosecution of charitable
trust abuses.163 Each agency would be composed of a board of
directors with members that would be invested in the public interest, but would not have any direct attachments to the particular trusts.164 This Part explains the responsibilities and
formation of these agencies.
A. RESPONSIBILITIES TO MONITOR REGISTRATION AND
REPORTING
These quasi-state agencies would assume the obligations of
the state attorneys general to regulate charitable trusts and to
serve the public interest. As a result, the agencies would be responsible for all the duties associated with the role of attorneys
general as charitable trust watchdogs.165 Additionally, the
agencies would be responsible for maintaining detailed records
of all charitable trusts in the state. Following the lead of the
New York Charities Bureau’s registration and reporting
scheme, charitable trusts would be required to register the
162. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 55.
163. Helge, supra note 13, at 64 (explaining the enforcement model as
granting “the regulatory body . . . authority to promulgate rules, investigate
breaches of these rules, and bring enforcement actions for wrongdoings”).
164. But see id. at 71 (arguing that “inclusion of the charitable sector’s
voice in its oversight is vital to the effectiveness of the sector’s regulation”).
165. The legislature has the power to take duties away from the attorney
general, thus the legislature would vest the quasi-state agency with the attorney general’s regulatory obligations regarding charitable trusts. See Clayton,
supra note 9, at 528 (“‘There is and has been no doubt that the legislature may
deprive the attorney general of specific powers; but in the absence of such authority he typically may exercise all such authority as the public interest requires.’” (quoting Florida ex rel Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268–69
(5th Cir. 1976))).
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trust with the state agency and supply annual reporting.166
Registration would include not only the trust’s financial information, but also the trust instrument explaining the purpose
and restrictions imposed on the trust.167 In order to account for
all charitable trusts, organizations like universities and hospitals would not be exempt from the registration and reporting
requirements.168 Non-solicitation charities would also be required to comply with the registration and reporting. Moreover,
contrary to most of the current practices of attorneys general,169 the solicitation of charitable funds would not be the
agency’s primary concern because the majority of charitable
trusts do not solicit public funding.170 Although this may cause
consternation for potential mistreatment of funds that are solicited for charitable purposes, that fear can be displaced by
maintaining the attorney general as the regulator for solicitation of charitable funds.171 In the unusual event that a charitable trust solicits funds, the quasi-state agency would collaborate with the attorney general to effectively monitor potential
abuses of both fiduciary obligations and solicitation.172
166. See Brody, supra note 8, at 951–52, 952 n.54. However, unlike the
New York Charities Bureau, the proposed agencies would not operate under
the state attorney general.
167. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317A.111 (West 2011) (establishing corporate registration requirements under Minnesota law); PROTECTION OF
CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 5 (Tentative Draft 2011), available at http://www
.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ocaa/2011feb_draft.pdf
(identifying
information to be held in an attorney general’s registry under model code); N.Y.
State Office of the Att’y Gen., FAQs—Registration, CHARITIES NYS.COM,
http://www.charitiesnys.com/faqs_reg_new.jsp ( last visited June 4, 2012) ( listing registration requirements for New York charities).
168. But see PROTECTION OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 5 (Tentative Draft
2011), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ocaa/2011feb_
draft.pdf (creating a category of exemptions from registration requirements).
169. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 443 (explaining that attorneys
general focus most of their attention and resources on the solicitation of charitable funds).
170. See id. at 375 (explaining that the 1960 Karst proposal has not been
adopted by states because the focus has shifted to federal government and IRS
enforcement solutions and because of problems with state regulation of Internet solicitation).
171. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42 (suggesting that in
practice the regulation of charitable trusts and the regulation of charitable solicitation are often mutually exclusive).
172. Thus the attorney general, partnered with the IRS, would still be responsible for enforcing proper charitable solicitation and the agency would be
responsible for enforcing the restrictions set forth in the charitable trust document and ensuring that the trust served the purpose it was intended to
serve.

1822

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1795

The agencies would have the responsibility to methodically
review the registration and reports and evaluate if any further
investigation is needed to prevent abuse or mismanagement.173
Since this would be the agency’s sole duty, the issue of this obligation becoming a secondary concern would be obsolete.174
Following an enforcement model of regulation, the agency
would be authorized by the state legislature to enforce a charitable trust if the trustee breached a fiduciary duty.175 An enforcement model of regulation would cure the problems that
underlay commissions or bureaus that operate under an advisory model of regulation.176 In addition, because of the quality
of information provided to the agency and the effective review
of that information, the agency would be better equipped to
propose successful solutions if a charitable trust became impossible or impractical. Thus, if absolutely necessary, in a cy près
hearing the agency could recommend plausible modifications to
the restrictions of the charitable trust without completely overrunning the intent of donors.
B. DEVELOPING THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The success of the agency would stem from the construction of the board of directors. The volunteer board would be
composed of individuals who have a strong interest and experience in the charitable sector.177 The set number of board members would vary from state to state depending on the demand
for charitable trust regulation. States with more charitable
trusts would require an agency with more personnel to support
173. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 273. Similar to elements of the Uniform Law Commission’s ongoing project to draft a model act on attorney general protection of charitable assets, the agency could conduct an investigation
if “a law or legal duty concerning the use or management of charitable assets
has been violated.” PROTECTION OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 4 (Tentative
Draft 2011), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ocaa/
2011feb_draft.pdf.
174. Furthermore, nonprofit organizations and charities have become increasingly large, complex, and pervasive, and having a separate state agency
to monitor the sector is reasonable. See THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46.
175. See Clayton, supra note 9, at 528 (illustrating how state legislatures
can empower agencies to act in lieu of the attorney general). But see Fishman,
supra note 12, at 273–74 (advocating for the assistant attorney general to initiate actions against breaches of duty).
176. See Helge, supra note 13, at 60 (identifying lack of uniformity, cost,
politicization, and agency restraints as reasons the advisory model fails).
177. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 273 (illustrating an ideal mixture of
individuals to constitute charitable commissioners).
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the demand.178 The members of the charitable trust agency’s
board would be appointed by the governor and the state supreme court—similar to the boards created by the Minnesota
legislature, such as the Lessard-Sams Outdoor Heritage Council and the Minnesota State Art Board.179
Nomination by seemingly neutral actors, such as justices of
the state supreme court, would not ensure noncorrupt behavior.
For example, the Bishop Estate trust—a charitable trust created by Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, one of the largest landowners and the richest woman in the Hawaiian kingdom, to
erect and maintain the Kamehameha Schools to benefit the
children of the Hawaiian Islands—involved corrupt Hawaii Supreme Court justices taking millions of dollars from the trust
for personal gain.180 Additionally, appointment by an elected
official is similar to advisory commissions,181 which are supervised by that official and therefore still subject to political influences. Although not all politics would be removed, to curb
these potential conflicts the attorney general would not supervise the enforcement agency. Furthermore, appointment would
at least remove the direct political influences that are inherent
with elected officials.182 In a further effort to prevent outside
influences affecting the board members’ neutrality, if a conflict
of interest arose the affected board member would be required
to remove him or herself from the monitoring of that particular
charitable trust.183
C. FULLY SELF-FUNDED
The charitable trust agencies would be completely selffunded, unlike the Minnesota boards mentioned above, which
178. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 444 –45 (noting that certain
states have thousands of charities supervised by attorneys general with “limited staff and inadequate financial resources”).
179. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 273; Lessard-Sams Outdoor Heritage
Council Members, LESSARD-SAMS OUTDOOR HERITAGE COUNCIL, http://www
.lsohc.leg.mn/Member/index.html ( last visited June 4, 2012) (identifying the
twelve members of the Lessard-Sams Outdoor Heritage Council); Board Members, MINN. ST. ARTS BOARD, http://www.arts.state.mn.us/contact/board.htm
( last visited June 4, 2012) (identifying the members and officers of the Minnesota State Arts Board).
180. KING & ROTH, supra note 128, at 211–14.
181. See WOLANIN, supra note 87.
182. Brody, supra note 8, at 984.
183. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317A.255 (West 2011) (establishing
standards for legitimate and illegitimate conflicts of interest for the director of
a trust).
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are funded by a portion of the state’s sale tax.184 In order to fully fund the agencies, a fee would be assessed at the time of initial registration and annually thereafter.185 Because the organizations that traditionally have been exempt from registration
and reporting would also be required to comply with the requirements, the organization’s income and assets would be considered when determining the registration and annual reporting fees, so not to make it financially unattainable for a
charitable trust to be formed.186 However, the registration and
reporting fees would have to be assessed to cover all investigative and enforcement procedures, which could potentially cause
high annual fees leading to a disincentive to form a charitable
trust. Additionally, although the board of directors would be
filled on a volunteer basis, the fees would encompass the agency’s staff compensation. If the annual fees are not able to raise
the necessary funds, the agencies would become underfunded
like many of the offices of attorneys general,187 resulting in continuing ineffectiveness in monitoring charitable trusts. However, charitable trusts play an important role in local and national communities to relieve poverty, advance education, and
religion.188 The inclination of individuals to donate to others in
need or for public benefit is inherent in our society,189 and the

184. LESSARD-SAMS OUTDOOR HERITAGE COUNCIL, http://www.lsohc.leg
.mn/index.html ( last visited June 4, 2012).
185. Helge, supra note 13, at 66–67 (analogizing to federal agencies that
are self-funded). The Uniform Law Committee proposed a $15 registration fee
with a $25 monthly late fee. PROTECTION OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 5
(Tentative Draft 2011), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/
ulc/ocaa/2011feb_draft.pdf. More likely than not, to fully support the agency’s
regulatory power a slightly larger fee would be assessed.
186. See Helge, supra note 13, at 73 (arguing that self-funding fees can be
placed on a sliding scale examining a trust’s asset size, gross revenues, or
both).
187. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 445 (identifying underfunding
as the principal reason for the disinterest of attorneys general in supervision
of charitable trusts).
188. ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY & TRUSTS 995–96 (Routledge-Cavendish
6th ed. 2010); see also Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation and
Charity Autonomy: How Public is Private Philanthropy, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
571, 613–14 (2010) (arguing that charities provide a “powerful third force”
that is an independent civic good).
189. See, e.g., Alison Dunn, As ‘Cold as Charity’?: Poverty, Equity, and the
Charity Trust, 20 LEGAL STUD. 222, 223–25 (2000) (“Whether on religious or
moral grounds, both Victorian and contemporary society have inclined toward
the former, and by the nineteenth century there was a firm entrenchment of
philanthropy in society.”).
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law has long supported the continuation of this practice.190
Thus, it is unlikely that this mandatory registration and reporting fee would be such a deterrent as to extinguish the creation of charitable trusts.
A wholly self-funded agency is the main distinction from
earlier proposed state agencies to supervise charitable trusts.
Noticing the local importance of charitable trusts and the
shortfalls of supervision,191 earlier proposals have suggested
state agencies.192 One of the earliest proposals, suggested in
1960, did not include a self-funded agency, but instead recommended heavier taxation to support the agency.193 As mentioned above, states are already suffering from decreased tax
revenue.194 Although this Note agrees that scholars were correct in recognizing that a separate state agency would cure
many of the outstanding issues in charitable trust law, during
the current financial crisis it is unrealistic to suggest that the
state could spread its budget even more thinly to include a new
agency to watch over charitable trusts.195 For that reason, state
budgets would not have to incorporate this Note’s proposed independent agency into its budget. Furthermore, if the funding
would come from the state taxes, there could be potential for
variations in the effectiveness of agencies from state to state
due to variations in funding leading to variations in resources.
But with fees assessed to each charitable trust, the funding for
the agency would correlate with the number of charities in that

190. See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 591 (1867) (“Our ancestors brought with them from England the elements of the law of charitable
uses, and . . . in substance and principle, [it] has always been considered as
part of our common law.”).
191. Although it is unlikely that registration and reporting fees will deter
charitable giving, “there is a compelling argument that potential donors will
keep wealth in private hands rather than create charitable trusts if they believe their wishes will not be followed strictly.” Eisenstein, supra note 16, at
1758.
192. Karst, supra note 31, at 483.
193. Id.; see also MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 452–54 (1965). Fremont-Smith analyzes Karst’s 1960 proposal and
argues that “[i]f the field of charity continues to grow,” Karst’s proposal of
“separate Boards of Charity . . . will become, not only advisable, but highly desirable.” Id. at 453.
194. MCNICHOL ET AL., supra note 92.
195. See Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Interest Adds Up to a
$1.3 Billion Bill for States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/us/politics/15stimulus.html
(reporting
congressional refusal to assist state budgets during the recession).
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particular state.196 Therefore, the agency would be adequately
self-funded to support the effective supervision of all the states’
charitable trusts.
In sum, a self-funded, independent, quasi-state agency
would cure many of the outstanding enforcement issues in
charitable trust law. A mandatory registration and reporting,
like that suggested by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1954 and currently proposed,
would provide the agency with the necessary information to detect and prosecute fiduciary breaches of charitable trusts. Additionally, a mandatory registration and annual fee would allow
the agency to be self-sufficient and completely independent
from the state budget. Although this fee could cause hardships
and deterrence impacts on a minority of charitable trusts, this
impact would not be as significant as disincentives caused by
donors’ wishes not being followed. Furthermore, there may still
be a slight concern for political influences on the agency’s board
of directors, but the board of directors would not be elected officials, thus avoiding the inherent political nature imbedded in
attorneys general. When the public benefit at large is at issue it
is highly unlikely that political influences will ever be completely removed. However, by creating an agency that is composed of nominated directors, which is completely self-funded
and independent, various political incentives can be subsided.
CONCLUSION
Donors create charitable trusts to serve the public interest
and set strict restrictions on the trust to ensure that those
wishes are followed long after their death. As demonstrated by
the current economic turmoil, the restrictions imposed on the
charitable trusts can become impractical or impossible to obey.
The recent financial crisis produces incentives for the trustees
to diverge from the restrictions emphasizing the ineffective supervision of the trusts by attorneys general. While taking into
account the strained economies of the states, this Note’s proposal to create self-funded, independent, quasi-state agencies,
would resolve many of the issues outstanding in the management of charitable trusts. Although political influences cannot
be completely removed from supervision of charitable trusts,
196. Not every state has the same number of charities or charitable trusts;
the majority of charities are in fact organized in one of the twelve states that
have required registration of reporting for nonsolicitation purposes. FREMONTSMITH, supra note 14, at 444.
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these agencies would certainly be less likely to be persuaded by
political influences than state attorneys general, who are elected officials in the majority of the states. New agencies would
help curb the abuses of charitable trusts and be better
equipped to propose acceptable modifications if the restrictions
imposed by the donor(s) become truly problematic. The recently
experienced deviations from donors’ wishes will continue to be
a problem if there is not an effective watchdog in place. This
debate has been going on for far too long in the scholarly world,
and it is time that the states take action.

